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Texas v. United States Steel Corp. and Illinois
v. Sarbaugh: The Disclosure and Use of Grand
Jury Transcripts in Private Antitrust Litigation
For centuries a policy has existed of protecting the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings and of safeguarding the testimony of witnesses who appear before the grand jury. Developments within the
past two decades, however, have forced the courts to re-examine this
policy and to determine whether reasons traditionally advanced in
support of grand jury secrecy have retained the vitality previously
attributed to them. The principal cause of this re-evaluation has
been the growing liberalization of criminal discovery: specifically,
the criminal defendant's right to obtain his own grand jury testimony as well as the testimony of government witnesses.' The expansion of the defendant's access to grand jury materials in criminal
cases has produced unexpected side effects upon civil litigation,
where, despite a philosophy of liberal pre-trial disclosure, access to
grand jury materials has been limited.2 The center of the controversy is in balancing the policy which requires secrecy for grand jury
proceedings against the policy which requires full disclosure of all
available evidence "in order that the ends of justice may be
served.'"I
5
4
Texas v. United States Steel Corp. and Illinois v. Sarbaugh
represent two important pronouncements concerning the scope of
civil discovery of grand jury materials in private antitrust litigation. Although the cases may be reconcilable, upon closer examina1. See text accompanying notes 46 through 47 infra.
2. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C., were promulgated in 1938. The rules
are intended to "make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with
the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." United States v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.,
were adopted in 1946 but, until the amendments of 1966 and 1974, the discovery granted the
defendant was very limited. See 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND AND PROCEDURE § 251,
at 491 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
3. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. City of Fort Pierce, Fla., 323 F.2d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1963).
4. 546 F.2d 626 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 262 (1977).
5. 552 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 262 (1977).
6. Although the question of access to grand jury materials in a civil proceeding is certainly
not unique to the antitrust field, it commonly arises there due to the nature of the private
antitrust action. Private treble damage actions were created by Congress to aid in the
"vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws." Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349
U.S. 322, 329 (1955). In addition to the recovery of treble damages, § 4 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), allows private plaintiffs to recover reasonable attorney's fees, and §
5(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1976), renders a prior federal criminal or civil judgment
prima facie, evidence of liability in a subsequent private action. See also Illinois v. Huckaba
& Sons Construction Co., 442 F. Supp. 56 (S.D. Ill. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1479 (7th
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tion they demonstrate the current tension between courts which
apply the traditional reasons for grand jury secrecy and courts
which question the basis for secrecy in light of expanded criminal
discovery.
This article will analyze United States Steel and Sarbaugh and
attempt to determine their place in the recent development of the
law of federal grand jury secrecy. 7 The current viability of asserted
justifications for grand jury secrecy will be examined in light of
these decisions and the expansion of 'criminal discovery. Additionally, the discussion will consider whether the "particularized compelling need" standard of United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.'
remains a formidable barrier to disclosure in the private antitrust
context. In conclusion, this article will focus on the practical difficulties that remain for the practitioner attempting to secure grand
jury transcripts, and will examine the proper use of grand jury materials once they have been obtained.
THE POLICY OF GRAND JURY SECRECY
9
HistoricalFoundations

The grand jury was established in England in 1166, but the policy
of secrecy in its proceedings did not arise until the Earl of
Shaftesbury treason trial of 1681.'° A fundamental facet of English
jurisprudence, the grand jury was transported to the American colonies in the seventeenth century. Its importance to the Founders as
a bulwark of personal liberty is illustrated by the fifth amendment's
guarantee of the right to indictment by grand jury. Although abolished in the country of its origin" and used with less frequency in
Cir. April 13, 1978) (federal criminal antitrust judgment given collateral estoppel effect in
subsequent treble damage action).
The effect of these provisions is that almost invariably, private antitrust actions follow in
the heels of a Justice Department criminal suit. In the civil case from which the issues in
Sarbaugh arose, Illinois v. Champaign Asphalt Co., S-CIV-73-216 (S.D. Ill., filed Nov. 7,
1973), the allegations of the complaint are virtually identical to those contained in the indictment in United State v. Champaign Asphalt Co., CR-72-67 (E.D. Ill., filed Dec. 19, 1972).
Because of this symbiotic relationship, grand jury testimony is of inestimable value to the
private plaintiff whose suit is based upon the same conduct as the federal criminal action.
7. The scope of this article is limited to the grand jury issue in the context of federal
antitrust litigation.

8.

356 U.S. 677 (1958).

9. For a more detailed discussion of the historical development of the grand jury, see
Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455, 456-60 (1965)[hereinafter cited as Calkins] and the authorities cited therein. See also Corona Construction Co. v. Ampress Brick
Co., 376 F. Supp. 598, 600 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
10. Calkins, supra note 9, at 457.
11. Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 J.MA~. J. PRAc. & PROC. 18, 23,
25 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Myth.]
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the state courts, 2 the grand jury has been employed extensively in
the federal system." Indictment by grand jury is available for all
federal crimes that are punishable by more than one year in prison.' 4
Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the
principal regulation of grand jury proceedings. Subsection (e) of
Rule 6 perpetuates the traditional policy favoring secrecy in grand
jury matters."
Judicial Treatment of the Policy of Secrecy
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that "[girand
jury testimony is ordinarily confidential. . .. But after the grand
jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the
ends of justice require it."'" Rule 6(e) commits the determination of
when "the ends of justice" require disclosure to the discretion of the
district court in which the grand jury was convened.' 7 The rule
specifies that disclosure may be made:
[1] [T]o attorneys for the government for use in the performance
of their duties. . . [2] preliminarily to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding [3] when permitted by the court at the request
of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a
motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occuring before the grand jury."
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
WmGHT, supra note 2, § 101, at 150.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7.

Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations
and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use
in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes recorded testimony may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed
by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when
permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds
may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring
before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person
except in accordance with this rule. The court may direct that an indictment shall
be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has given bail, and in that event
the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person shall disclose the finding of the
indictment except when necessary for the issuance and execution of warrant or
summons.
16. United States v. Socony-Vaccuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233-34 (1940).
17. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959). Local rules often
require only the chief judge of the district to pass on the question of disclosure. See, e.g., Local
Crim. Rule 1.04(e)(N.D. Ill. 1977). The chief judge may delegate his authority. See In re
Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,807 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Alton Box Board Co., No. 77-1694, 1697, 1698 (7th Cir. Dec. 1, 1977),
cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3763 (1978).
18. See note 15 supra. "Attorneys for the government" refers only to attorneys for the
federal government. Corona Construction Co. v. Ampress Brick Co., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 598,
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Only the second circumstance is pertinent to the disclosure of grand
jury materials in a private antitrust action.
Courts have asserted five justifications in support of the policy of
grand jury secrecy: (1) to prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the
grand jury in its deliberations and to prevent persons subject to
indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jury; (3) to
prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who
may testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of
those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosure by persons who have information with request to the commission of crimes; and (5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and free from the expense of standing trial where there was no
probability of guilt.'9 The dual purpose of these justifications is to
protect the integrity of ongoing grand jury proceedings and to assure
the effective functioning of future grand juries.'
The need for secrecy during a grand jury investigation is almost
universally conceded,2 ' but the courts and commentators have questioned the need for continued secrecy after the proceedings have
been terminated.2 2 The first three policy reasons no longer apply
when grand jury proceedings and all criminal actions arising therefrom have been completed and the grand jury materials are sought
in a subsequent civil case. 3 Furthermore, if the defendant is the
same in the criminal and civil case, the fifth policy reason is also
irrelevant. 2 Only the fourth reason for grand jury secrecy, the encouragement of free and untrammeled disclosure by grand jury witnesses, may be'relevant after the grand jury has been discharged.
601 (N.D. Ill.
1974). Judge Learned Hand defined the term "judicial proceeding" as including
"any proceeding determinable by a court, having for its object the compliance of any person,
subject to judicial control, with standards imposed upon his conduct in the public interest,
even though such compliance is enforced without the procedure applicable to the punishment
of crime," in allowing disclosure for use in a state disbarment proceeding. Doe v. Rosenberry,
255 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1958).
19. See United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3rd Cir. 1954). These reasons were
quoted with approval in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n. 6 (1958).
For criticism, see Calkins, supra note 9; Myth, supra note 11; Knudsen, PretrialDisclosure
of Federal Grand Jury Testimony, 48 WASH. L. REv. 423 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Knudsen]; Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The UnreasonableRule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REV.
669 (1962).
20. See Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 774-75 (7th Cir. 1977).
21. Knudsen, supra note 19, at 428. But see Sherry, supra note 19, at 668-69 n.3.
22. See WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 106, at 170-71, and authorities cited in note 19 supra.
23. See In re Cement-Concrete Block, Chicago Area, 381 F. Supp. 1108, 1110 (N.D. Ill.
1974), and authorities cited in note 19 supra.
24. Id.; United States v. Scott Paper Co., 254 F. Supp. 759, 760-61 (E.D. Wis. 1966).
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It is upon this ground that the battle for civil disclosure has been
fought.
The standard used to determine the propriety of grand jury disclosure was developed in three Supreme Court decisions. In United
States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,25 the Justice Department brought
a civil antitrust action after a grand jury investigating possible
criminal violations of the Sherman Act" had failed to return an
indictment. Thereafter the Antitrust Division used the grand jury
transcripts to prepare for the civil case. The defendants moved for
discovery and production of the transcripts; the district court
granted their disclosure.
The lower court's decision was subsequently reversed by the
United States Supreme Court. Noting the federal judicial policy of
maintaining grand jury secrecy, 7 Mr. Justice Douglas wrote that
secrecy must not be broken "except where there is a compelling
necessity . . . . shown with particularity."28 The defendant's request was characterized as an attempt to obtain the "wholesale
discovery and production of a grand jury transcript under Rule
34."29 The Court noted that "particularized need" existed only
where grand jury transcripts were requested in order "to impeach a
witness [at the trial], to refresh his recollection, to test his credibility and the like." 0 The mere relevancy and usefulness of transcripts
in the conduct of litigation did not constitute a sufficient showing
of good cause.
Similarly, in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,3 the
Court declared that defendants in a criminal antitrust prosecution
did not have the right to inspect the grand jury testimony of the
Government's key trial witness. In PittsburghPlate Glass, the trial
judge had denied the defendants' request for inspection of grand
jury transcripts because no inconsistency between the witness'
grand jury testimony had been demonstrated. The Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court, holding that particularized need had not
been shown and that the defendants' asserted "right" of inspection
ran "counter to a 'long established policy' of secrecy . . . older than
our Nation itself."32 In the Court's view, disclosure under the circumstances would restrict the grand jury's access to information:
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
R. Ctv.
30.
31.
32.

356 U.S. 677 (1958).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
356 U.S. at 681.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 683 (original emphasis). The showing of "good cause" for discovery under FED.
P. 34 was eliminated by the 1970 amendment. March 30, 1970, eff. July 1, 1970.
Id.
360 U.S. 395 (1959).
Id. at 399.
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Not only would the participation of the jurors be curtailed, but
testimony would be parsimonious if each witness knew that his
testimony would soon be in the hands of the accused. Especially
is this true in antitrust proceedings where fear of business reprisal
might haunt both the grand juror and the witness. And this "go
slow" sign would continue as realistically at the time of trial as
theretofore3
The majority cautioned, however, that secrecy was not absolute.
The burden was placed "on the defense to show that 'a particularized need' exists for the for the minutes which outweighs the policy
of secrecy."' ' Unfortunately, the manner in which this balancing
process was to be performed was stated in ambiguous terms. The
Court rejected a requirement that defendants show a contradiction
between trial and grand jury testimony and refused to rule on the
propriety of in camera inspection by the trial court to determine if
discrepancies were present. 5
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by three other members of the Court,
registered a strong dissent. 6 In attempting to determine whether the
reasons for secrecy were actually present he stated that grand jury
secrecy was not an end in itself. Moreover, to promote the fair administration of criminal justice, secrecy could be lifted when its
advantages were outweighed by a countervailing interest in disclosure. 7 In the dissenters' view, not even the fourth policy reason for
grand jury was applicable to the circumstances of the case:
Disclosure of Jones' relevant grand jury testimony could not produce the apprehended results of retaliation or discomfort which
might induce a reluctance in others to testify before grand juries.
Jones has already taken the stand and testified freely in open court
against the defendants. His testimony has been extremely damaging. .

.

. Witnesses before a grand jury necessarily know that once

called by the Government to testify at trial they cannot remain
secret informants quite apart from whether their grand jury testimony is discoverable3
33. Id. at 400. It is difficult to see what greater showing of particularized need could have
been made by the defendants. As one commentator has indicated: "petitioners specifically
sought the testimony of the witness in question for the purpose of impeaching that witness,
an instance which the court had characterized as a showing of particularized need [in Procter
& Gamble]." Myth, supra note 11, at 27.
34. 360 U.S. at 400.
35. Id. at 400-01.
36. Mr. Justice Douglas, the author of the majority opinion in Procter & Gamble, joined
the dissent along with Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Black.
37. 360 U.S. at 403.
38. Id. at 406. This is a case in which the rationale of the dissenting opinion later became
the law. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 872-74 (1966); U.S. Industries v.
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The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on grand jury
secrecy is Dennis v. United States.31 In Dennis, petitioners were
indicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States by filing false
affadavits concerning their membership in the Communist Party.
The trial judge denied defense motions requesting production or,
alternatively, in camera inspection, of the grand jury testimony of
key Government witnesses. A unanimous Court reversed the trial
court's decision. Citing approvingly the dissenting opinion in
PittsburghPlate Glass and law review articles critical of grand jury
secrecy,4" the Court indicated that "[iun our adversary system for
determining guilt or innocence, it is rarely justifiable for the prosecution to have exclusive access to a storehouse of relevant fact.
Exceptions to this are justifiable only by the clearest and most
compelling considerations."'" The defendants' showing of particularized need went "substantially beyond the minimum required by
Rule 6(e) and the prior decisions of this Court."4 2 Significantly, the
Court rejected in camera inspection as being inadequate to protect
the interests of the defendant. The trial court was limited to determining the existence of particularized need, supervising production
and granting protective orders in "unusual situations" that required
the breach of secrecy to be minimized.4
Criminal Discovery of Grand Jury Materials
In conjunction with the Court's receptiveness to liberal grand jury
disclosure, a movement toward broader criminal discovery was established under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Jencks Act." In 1966, Rule 16(a) was amended to allow a defendant
access to his own grand jury testimony. Decisions interpreting the
rule held that a corporate defendant in a criminal antitrust action
was entitled to inspect grand jury testimony of employees without
demonstrating particularized need.4" This development was made
United States District Court, 345 F.2d 18, 21 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965);
Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 37, 41 (N.D. Il1. 1969), rev'd in part on
other grounds sub noma.Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 428 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970),
aff'd by equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
39. 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
40. Id. at 870, 871 n. 17, 872 n.18.
41. Id. at 873.
42. Id. at 872.
43. Id. at 875.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (defendant
has a right to discover exculpatory evidence held by prosecution).
45. United States v. Hughes, 388 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 93
(1970); United States v. Aeroquip Corp., 41 F.R.D. 441 (E.D. Mich. 1966). The rule was
amended on Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966. See WUowrr, supra note 2, § 253 at 508.
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explicit by the 1975 amendment to the rule which gave the courts
the discretion to grant discovery of the relevant grand jury testimony of employees who could bind the corporation either at the
time of the alleged act or at the time they appeared before the grand
46
jury.
The 1970 amendment to the Jencks Act undermined the holding
in Pittsburgh Plate Glass by permitting the defendant to discover
the grand jury testimony of a government witness without showing
particularized need, after the witness has given his direct testimony
at trial. 7 In practice, disclosure has been made prior to the witness'
testifying through voluntary production by the Justice Department
or by court order."
46.

FED. R. CaM. P. 16(a)(1)(A) provides:

Upon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect
and copy or photograph: any relevant written or recorded statements made by the
defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may
become known, to the attorney for the government; the substance of any oral
statement which the government intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by
the defendant whether before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any
person then known to the defendant to be a government agent; and recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged.
Where the defendant is a corporation, partnership, association or labor union, the
court may grant the defendant, upon its motion, discovery of relevant recorded
testimony of any witness before a grand jury who (1) was, at the time of his tesimony, so situated as an officer or employee as to have been able legally to bind the
defendant in respect to conduct constituting the offense, or (2) was, at the time of
the offense, personally involved in the alleged conduct constituting the offense and
so situated as an officer or employee as to have been able legally to bind the
defendant in respect to that alleged conduct in which he was involved. As amended,
April 22, 1974, eff. Dec. 1, 1975.
47. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976), provides in pertinent part:
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination,
the court shall, on motion of the defendant order the United States to produce any
statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United
States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If
the entire contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant
for his examination and use.
(e) The term "statement", as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section
in relation to any witness called by the United States means(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made
by said witness to a grand jury.
48. See Brief for United States at 4, United States v. Alton Box Board Co. - In re Folding
Carton Antitrust Litigation, No. 77-1694, 1697, 1698 (7th Cir. Dec. 1, 1977) [hereinafter cited
as Brief for United States]. Pre-trial disclosure has been ordered under the district court's
Rule 6(e) power. United States v. Machi, 324 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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DISCOVERY IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION

The Electrical Equipment Cases
Although Procter & Gamble and Pittsburgh Plate Glass never
addressed the question of disclosure of grand jury transcripts in aid
of private antitrust litigation, that question was answered in the
course of the Electrical Equipment antitrust cases.49 These cases
represented the first attempts by a civil plaintiff to obtain the grand
jury minutes of a civil defendant. 0 Production was sought primarily
for use in deposing the employees of corporate defendants, as well
as for use at trial.

In City of Philadelphiav. Westinghouse Electric Co., 5 district

Judge Clary prescribed the procedure for obtaining the disclosure of
grand jury materials." The practice was to call the witness for a
deposition, elicit his failure to recall pertinent facts or possible inconsistencies between his current statements and his former testimony, and, having laid this foundation, request an in camera examination of the grand jury transcript by the deposition judge. If the
court found inconsistencies between the deposition testimony and
the grand jury transcript it would determine, in its discretion,
whether there was a compelling need for disclosure.13 Disclosure was
permitted "solely for the personal perusal of counsel attending the
deposition"5 4 and the transcript was to be used only for such further
interrogation of the deponent as was authorized. Copying in any
form was prohibited and the transcript had to be returned to the
court at the close of the deposition. At trial, either the deposition
or the grand jury testimony could be used for impeachment or refreshing recollection." This procedure was followed throughout the
country in the electrical cases.5
49. Approximately 1,900 cases were involved in the litigation. See generally Hanley,
Obtainingand Using GrandJury Minutes in Treble Damages Antitrust Actions, 11 ANTITRUST
BULL. 659 (1966)[hereinafter cited as Hanley]; McInerney, Discovery and Use of GrandJury
Minutes, 1966 ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 91, 96-99 (1966); Neal and Goldberg, The ElectricalEquipment Cases; Novel JudicialAdministration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621 (1964); Note, Release of Grand
Jury Minutes in the National Deposition Program of the ElectricalEquipment Cases, 112 U.
PA. L. REV. 1133 (1964)[hereinafter cited as National Deposition Program].
50. National Deposition Program, supra note 49, at 1145.
51. 210 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
52. For in-depth discussions of the in camera procedure see Hanley and National Deposition Program, supra note 49.
53. 210 F. Supp. at 491.
54. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. City of Fort Pierce, Fla., 323 F.2d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 1963).
55. See Hanley supra note 49, at 674-75; see also text accompanying notes 136 through
139 infra.
56. See, e.g.,
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. City of Fort Pierce, 323 F.2d 233, 237 (5th Cir.
1963); Atlantic City Electric Co. v. A. B. Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1963), application
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Despite the unprecedented nature of the disclosure authorized by
City of Philadelphiaand other electrical cases, the manner in which
disclosure was effected is illustrative of the judiciary's adherence to
the traditional principles of Procter& Gamble and PittsburghPlate
Glass. In City of Philadelphia,Judge Clary indicated that the
breakdown of the reasons for secrecy could not alone be a sufficient
basis for disclosure:
[T]here can be no policy in favor disclosure unless there is particular need. The lack or improbability of harm is but a factor in the
evaluation of the need for secrecy. It is not a factor demonstrating
a need for disclosure. . . .If judicial determination could be made
by something as simple as a mechanical balance, the weight on the
side of disclosure would have to clearly tip the balance in its
favor.57
This view, in the words of Justice Brennan's dissent in Pittsburgh
Plate Glass, "exalt[ed] the principle of secrecy for secrecy's
sake. . . ."5
Subsequent Developments
Even prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dennis, the rigid
view exemplified by Judge Clary's opinion in City of Philadelphia
was being tempered. In U.S. Industries v. United States District
Court,5" defendants in a treble damage action moved to have a government pre-sentencing memorandum containing grand jury testimony resealed in order to prevent its discovery by the civil plaintiffs. The memo had been prepared by the Justice Department in
connection with the preceding criminal antitrust prosecution and
the defendants had inspected it at that time. The Ninth Circuit
held that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in granting
discovery of the memo to the civil plaintiffs.
Although it recognized the policy of secrecy, the court refused to
apply the particularized need test "in vacuo." Instead, the court
endorsed a qualitative examination od the reasons for secrecy, as
applied to a particular situation. Then, "if the reasons for maintaining secrecy do not apply at all in a given situation, or apply to only
an insignificant degree, the party seeking disclosure should not be
required to demonstrate a large compelling need." 0 The prior disfor stay denied, 372 U.S. 669 (1963)(Harlan, J., in chambers); Nairn v. Clary, 312 F.2d 748
(3rd Cir. 1963); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 217 F. Supp. 36
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); In re Sellers, 32 F.R.D. 473 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed, (7th Cir. 1962).
57. 210 F. Supp. at 490.
58. 360 U.S. at 407.
59. 345 F.2d 18 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
60. Id. at 21.
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closure of the grand jury materials to the defendants vitiated the
fourth reason for secrecy "because those whom the witness most had
to fear have already seen the government memorandum, viz., their
own employers."'"
In light of modern procedural practice, the Ninth Circuit broke
with the precedents which had considered grand jury secrecy
"sacred." Favoring a contemporary appraisal of the problem, the
court said:
It . . .seems highly inequitable and averse to the principles of

federal discovery to allow
ment and not the other.
policy reason for denying
is essentially inapplicable

one party access to a government docuIt is particularly inequitable when the
the other party access to the document
to the given situation."2

U.S. Industries, coupled with the holding in Dennis," paved the
way for a number of district courts to adopt a pragmatic approach
to the question of discovery of grand jury materials. Where prior
disclosure of transcripts to criminal antitrust defendants had already been made, the district courts almost uniformly found particularized need and granted pre-trial discovery to treble damage
plaintiffs. Furthermore, at least one district court indicated that
61. Id. at 22. The defendants argued that disclosure of the pre-sentencing memo had been
made only to defense counsel and not the defendants themselves and, therefore, secrecy had
not been breached. The court rejected this, indicating that "knowledge of opposing counsel
in itself prejudices respondents. Moreover, petitioner's counsel were not precluded from conveying what they learned from their inspection of the memorandum to their clients." Id. at
23 n.1.
Similar arguments were rejected by Judge Will in In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation,
United States v. Alton Box
1977-2 TR.ADE CASES (CCH) 61,807 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd sub noma.
Board Co., No. 77-1694, 1697, 1698 (7th Cir. Dec. 1, 1977),cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3763
(1978): "[The corporate defendants] are trying to make a distinction between grand jury
transcripts which were examined by counsel for corporate officers, and say that it is not
produceable, but if it had been examined by counsel for the corporation it would be, and I
say nothing doing." Transcript of Hearing on P.T.O. 18, April 22, 1977, at 31. See also text
accompanying notes 112 through 114, infra.
62. 345 F.2d at 23.
63. It has been said that, in the context of disclosure for purposes of civil litigation, Dennis
"is of little or any force, since it rests on the special need for fair play to criminal defendants,
and the controlling case continues to be United States v. Procter & Gamble." WRIGHT, supra
note 2, § 109, at 188. This interpretation is too restrictive. The better view is that "[tihe
but rather in the shift in
impact of Dennis on the law lies not so much in its holding ...
policy reflected in its holding." Nitschke, Reflections on Some Evils of the Expanding Use of
the Grand Jury Transcript, 37 ABA ANTITRusT L. J. 198, 202 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Nitschke]. The courts seem to have agreed with the latter statement. See Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d at 774-77; Baker v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.2d 1074, 1080 (2d Cir.
1974)(Lumbard, J., dissenting); Washington v. American Pipe & Const. Co., 41 F.R.D. 59,
63 (W.D. Wash., D. Ore., D. Haw., N.D. Cal., S.D. Cal. 1966). See also, Myth, supra note
11, at 32: "The emergence of Dennis v. United States marks a new era in the federal courts'
approach to the doctrine of grand jury secrecy."
61,178 (D. Idaho,
64. Boise City, Idaho v. Monroc, Inc., 1976-2 TRADE CASES (CCH)
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the rationale for particularized need had no application whatsoever
where there had been prior disclosure to the defendant. 5 That court
treated the plaintiff's motion for production as it would any other
motion for civil discovery. In Baker v. United States Steel,"6 however, the Second Circuit, in dictum, rejected a "slight need" standard for disclosure of grand jury materials. This case may be distinguished since no prior disclosure to the defendants had been made,
and the court, citing U.S. Industries, indicated that "[p]erhaps
some relaxation of the 'particularized need' test might be justified
under other circumstances." 7
Texas v. United States Steel Corp.
As the foregoing materials illustrates, the trend toward liberal
discovery of grand jury materials is a very recent development. This
trend was maintained in the Sarbaughcase. But, as Texas v. United
States Steel Corp. indicates, the traditional notions protecting
grand jury secrecy are still viable.
In United States Steel, the State of Texas had filed a treble damage action subsequent to a federal criminal antitrust prosecution.
During the course of the criminal case the corporate defendants had
obtained transcripts of their employees' grand jury testimony pur1976); In re Sugar Antitrust Litigation, 1976-1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 60,934 (N.D.Cal. 1976);
Texas v. United States Steel Corp., No. 74-H-533 (S.D. Tex. June 3, 1976), rev'd, 546 F.2d
626 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 262 (1977); In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation, 19752 TRADE CASES (CCH)
60,557 (E.D. Mich. 1975); In re Cement-Concrete Block, Chicago
Area, 381 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Connecticut v. General Motors, 1974-2 TRADE CASES
(CCH)
75,138 (N.D. Il.1974); City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., CIV-No. 647-68
(D.N.J. 1971), appeal dismissed sub nom. United States v. American Oil Co., 456 F.2d 1043
(3rd Cir. 1972). Contra Illinois v. Sarbaugh, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. CR-72-67-D
(E.D. Ill. May 7, 1976), rev'd, 552 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 262 (1977);
Hancock Bros., Inc. v. Jones, 293 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Cal. 1968)(pre-sentencing memorandum which had previously been disclosed held not discoverable). The opinion in Hancock is
probably erroneous in view of the holding of the district court's own circuit in US. Industries.
See In re Arizona Dairy Products Litigation, 1976-1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 60,910 (D. Ariz.),
aff'd, (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 1975). See also text accompanying note 102 infra.
In Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1969), rev'd in part on
other grounds sub nom. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 428 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970),
aff'd by equally divided court, 400 U.S. 487 (1971), discovery was permitted even though there
was no prior disclosure. The court emphasized the unavailability of certain witnesses for
depositions and the fact that the defendants had extensively de-briefed their employees after
they had returned from testifying before the grand jury, thereby obtaining the substance of
their testimony. 50 F.R.D. at 42. See note 88 infra. See also S.E.C. v. National Student
Marketing Corp., 430 F.Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1977)(following U.S. Industries and CementConcrete Block in granting disclosure).
65. Connecticut v. General Motors Corp., 1974 TRADE CASES (CCH)
75,138 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
66. 492 F.2d 1074, 1079 (2d Cir. 1974).
67. Id.
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suant to Rule 16(a)(1)(A).6 All defendants in the criminal case
pleaded nolo contendre. In the course of its discovery, the State of
Texas served a Rule 3469 request on the civil defendants, demanding
various grand jury subpoenas, schedules, notices, summonses and
transcripts by employees. 0 When the defendants refused to release
the grand jury materials, plaintiff obtained a court order directing
production to be made. The order was subject to protective measures limiting disclosure to the State's attorneys for use in the treble
damage case only. The court did not undertake an in camera inspection.
On interlocutory appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding
that the district court had abused its discretion in granting disclosure. The court rejected the State's arguments that the particularized need test did not apply to the circumstances of the case and
that prior disclosure to the criminal defendants constituted a sufficient showing of particularized need. The language of the Fifth
Circuit is reminiscent of the district court's opinion in City of
Philadelphia:
The State underrates the importance of and misconceives the reasons for the cloak of grand jury secrecy: although several reasons
exist, the one most pertinent is the desire to create a sanctuary,
inviolate to any intrusion except on some special and overriding
need, where a witness may testify, free and unfettered by fear of
retaliation.7'
In a questionable analysis, the court compared the disclosure of
an employee's grand jury testimony to the corporate employer with
a witness' receipt of his own transcript." The court assumed that
in the latter circumstance grand jury secrecy remains unaffected."
It conceded that "the testimony of a hostile or disaffected employee
may well be a special case" 7' but the State had failed to prove that
such a situation existed.
The court of appeals rejected the position that disclosure under
Rule 16(a)(1)(A) meant "automatic discoverability" in a subsequent civil case because it "would restrict unduly the corporation's
use of the criminal defense tool which Congress saw fit to

grant.

.

.

. ",s

Thus, the State's request failed to meet the Procter

68.

See note 46 supra.

69.

FED. R. Civ. P. 34.

70.
71.
72.
73.

546 F.2d at 628.
Id. at 629 (footnotes omitted, original emphasis).
Id. at 630.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 113 through 114 infra.

74. Id.
75. Id.
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& Gamble test because it did not show particularized need in terms
of refreshing recollection, impeaching, testing credibility and the
like.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, certiorari was denied.7"
Illinois v. Sarbaugh
The facts in Sarbaugh were similar to those presented in United
States Steel. In connection with its treble damage action, the State
of Illinois sought discovery of grand jury materials" that had been
disclosed to the civil defendants in connection with the prior criminal case." However, in addition to a Rule 34 request to the civil
defendants, the State also directed a subpoena for the materials to
John Sarbaugh, Chief of the Midwest Office of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division. 9 As in United States Steel,s° no depositions of corporate employees who had testified before the grand jury
had been scheduled at the time the request was made. The State
subsequently sought an order compelling production in the Southern District of Illinois, the district where the civil case was filed.
That court held that only the Eastern District of Illinois, where the
grand jury had been empaneled, had jurisdiction to release the transcripts."' After a hearing on the matter, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Illinois denied disclosure, thereby declining to
follow the precedent established in U.S. Industriesand its progeny."2
76. 98 S. Ct. 262 (1977); see note 92 infra.
77. The state sought discovery of documents in the custody of the Justice Department
that had been submitted to the grand jury by the defendants. The district court held they
were not discoverable in the hands of the Department but that they would be discoverable
from they defendants after they were returned. This portion of the district court's order was
not appealed. 552 F.2d at 771-72 n.2. The state also'sought discovery of grand jury subpoenas
and the names of the witnesses who appeared in the course of the investigation. This request
was also denied, but it would appear that, on this point, the holding of the Seventh Circuit
overturned the district court.
78. Due to a peculiarity in the Justice Department's investigation of the highway construction industry in Southern Illinois, grand juries were empanelled and indictments were
returned in both the Southern and Eastern Districts of Illinois. Corporate defendants in both
cases received grand jury transcripts from the earlier Eastern District case, in connection with
the Southern District case, even if they had not previously received them in the Eastern
District. See Transcript of Hearings Before Chief Judge Wise, at 6-7, Illinois v. Sarbaugh,
CR-72-67 (E.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1976).
79. 552 F.2d at 771. The Seventh Circuit indicated that this factual difference had no
significance in terms of the secrecy issues. 552 F.2d at 777 n.14. The Justice Department did
not oppose disclosure. 552 F.2d at 772.
80. In United States Steel, Texas had held some depositions, but they were not of employees that had testified before the grand jury. See Brief of Respondents in Opposition to
Certiorari at 3, Texas v. United States Steel Corp., No. 76-1710, cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 262
(1977).
81. 552 F.2d at 770-71.
82. Id. at 771-72; see Memorandum Opinion of Wise, J., in Illinois v. Sarbaugh, In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, CR-72-67-D (E.D. Ill. entered May 7, 1976), reproduced in Petition
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On direct appeal,"3 the Seventh Circuit reversed, hoiding that the
district court abused its discretion in denying disclosure of the
grand jury transcripts. In contrast to the Fifth Circuit, the Sarbaugh
court acknowledged that the particularized need standard of
Procter & Gamble "may have 'been eroded to some extent'. . . by
language in Dennis v. United States, . . . if not by decisions of lower
federal courts led by U.S. Industries. ....,,14
These developments
and the expansion of criminal discovery did not, in the court's view,
eliminate the need to show particularized need, but they did lower
the threshold at which particularized need exists.
In addition, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that disclosure
under Rule 16(a)(1)(A) necessarily undermined the fourth policy
reason for grand jury secrecy:
In an antitrust context, the force of this reason is considerably
diminished by the disclosure pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1)(A) to the
witness' corporate employer, who has greater incentive and power
to retaliate than anyone else. Once the employer has the transcript, all that remains of the reason for secrecy is the need to
protect the witness, to the extent it is still possible to do so, from
potential adverse effects on his future relationships with members
of the industry other than his employer. This residual need cannot
for Writ of Certiorari, J.L. Simmons Co., Inc. v. Illinois and John E. Sarbaugh, cert. denied,
98 S.Ct. 262 (1977).
83. The defendants in the civil case contested the appealability of the district court's
order. The Seventh Circuit, declining to follow a contrary holding in Baker v. United States
Steel, 492 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir. 1974), held that the disposition of the transcripts in the Eastern
District was an independent proceeding and that the district court's order was final and
appealable. 552 F.2d at 773-74.
That this conclusion is not limited to the case in which transcripts are sought for use in a
district different from the one in which the grand jury was convened, is supported by the
Seventh Circuit's decision upholding appealability in United States v. Alton Box Board Co.In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, No. 77-1674, 1697, 1698 (7th Cir. Dec. 1, 1977) cert.
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3763 (1978). In that case, the grand jury and the civil case were both in
the Northern District of Illinois.
In Sarbaugh, the State of Illinois moved to strike the appearance of the corporate defendants in the court of appeals on the ground that they had not properly intervened below and,
thus, did not have standing to appeal. Noting the state's failure to object to the appearance
of the defendants below, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendants were entitled to
intervene in any event because "the advantages of an adversary proceeding are lost" if there
is no one to oppose the release of the transcripts. 552 F.2d at 773. The irony of corporate
defendants arguing in favor of the policy reasons behind continued secrecy has not gone
unnoticed. "It must be with tongue-in-cheek that defendants (who are the most likely to
retaliate and the least interested in effective antitrust grand jury investigations) express
solicitude for the witnesses who made admissions damaging to the defendants before the
grand jury." Brief for Appellee at 9, United States v. Alton Box Board Co.-In re Folding
Carton Antitrust Litigation, No. 77-1674, 1697, 1798 (7th Cir. Dec. 1, 1977).
84. 552 F.2d at 774.
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be dismissed as unworthy of any consideration ...

999
but ii can be

adequately dealt with by a protective order.1
The record in the lower court also indicated that on at least one
occasion, co-defendants had exchanged grand jury transcripts
among themselves. 8 The Seventh Circuit recognized that this factor
"will sometimes narrow the remaining zone of secrecy and further
dilute what remains of the reason for secrecy."87 Although the court
felt that such exchanges could possibly be limited by court order or
voluntary agreement, 8 when cross-delivery is made "the group of
potential retaliators who do not know of the grand jury testimony
is reduced and so is importance of maintaining secrecy." 8 9
In spite of its catalogue of factors diminishing the necessity for
secrecy, the court did not abrogate completely the particularized
need requirement. Instead, the Sarbaugh court, citing U.S.
Industries and Dennis, significantly lowered the level of need that
the civil plaintiff, the State, was required to demonstrate:
[W]e believe that a particularized need for the limited disclosure
we prescribe below is sufficiently shown if the corporate employer
of the grand jury witness whose transcript is sought has obtained
a copy of that transcript, and the witness is scheduled to be called
to give testimony either at trial or by deposition on the matters
about which he testified before the grand jury. 0
Although strict protective measures were imposed upon the process
85. Id. at 775.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Rule 6(e), FED. R. CRIM. P., imposes no obligation of secrecy upon the witnesses
who testify before the grand jury. In re Proceedings Before Grand Jury, 321 F. Supp. 238
(N.D. Ohio 1970). See WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 106 at 171; Darr. OF JusrCE AmTrRUST GRAND
JURY PRACTICE MANUAL 48-49 (CCH)(1975). It is common practice for corporate defendants
to de-brief their employees after they testify before the grand jury and thereby acquire
detailed knowledge of the substance of employee testimony. See HiLs, ANrrrrusT ADvtsER,
§ 10.20 at 503 (1971). The effect of this practice on the reasons for maintaining secrecy has
been duly noted. See Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 50 F.R.D., 37, 42, n.10. (N.D.
Ill. 1969).
Because of the absence of restrictions on witnesses, cross-delivery of transcripts violates no
rule. The Sarbaugh court did not view a court order restricting cross-delivery as an invasion
of the witness' freedom to disclose, however, since the restraint was pursuant to the corporation's exercise of its rights under Rules 6(e) and 16(a)(1)(A). 552 F.2d at 775. The court's
reference to a voluntary agreement to restrain disclosure was a recognition of the employment
of the practice in United States Steel. See 546 F.2d at 628. The efficacy of this type of
"gentleman's agreement" in assuring secrecy is highly questionable. It would be virtually
impossible to ensure compliance and, absent enforcement through a court order, it would
seem to be freely revocable by the parties without fear of sanction.
89. 552 F.2d at 775.
90. Id. at 777.
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of disclosure, 9 the court refused to require in camera inspection as
a prerequisite for discovery by the State.
On appeal, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.9 2
SECRECY

AFMER Sarbaugh AND United States Steel
The Decisions Compared

The Fifth Circuit rendered its decision in United States Steel
without the benefit of the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Sarbaugh.
The Sarbaugh court, although attempting to minimize the disparity
between the circuits, acknowledged a difference between each
court's approach. 3 Arguably, the decisions may be harmonious,"4
but analysis clearly places Sarbaugh in the mainstream of the liberal decisions following U.S. Industries, while aligning United
States Steel with the restrictive pronouncements of the Electrical
Equipment cases. Accordingly, the latter case is of limited importance in predicting future developments in this area of the law.
The court's analysis in United States Steel is objectionable for at
least two reasons. First, the Fifth Circuit completely ignored numerous prior decisions that had rejected a mechanical recitation of particularized need. Though the case discusses the issue of Rule
91. Release was made to a single attorney for the state, who was required to maintain a
log recording the handling of the transcripts. No copying was allowed and the transcripts had
to be returned after they had been used. The use of their transcripts was limited to impeachment, refreshing recollection and testing credibility. For criticism see text accompanying
notes 119 through 124 infra.
92. 98 S. Ct. 262 (1977). In view of the difference in approach taken by the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits, this denial is surprising. The Supreme Court has yet to speak on the
question of disclosure in civil litigation and its last pronouncement on grand jury secrecy was
in 1966. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966). Supreme Court resolution of the
grand jury issue may be forthcoming, however. See Petrol Stops Northwest v. United States,
1978-1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,935 (9th Cir. 1978), appeal docketed sub nor. Douglas Oil
Co. of Calif. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, No. 77-1547 (Sup. Ct. April 28, 1978).
Two other factors suggest the need for Supreme Court resolution of the disclosure issue.
First, this issue, as evidenced by the cases decided since Sarbaugh and United States Steel,
see note 104 infra, will continue to arise with great frequency in the future. As has been noted,
see note 6 supra, private antitrust suits consistently follow government criminal prosecutions,
and the issue will arise in every one of these. Second, Congress recently refused to include in
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (1976), a
provision which would have expanded access to grand jury materials in parens patriae actions. See amendment of September 8, 1976 to H.R. 8532. But see In re Montgomery County
Real Estate Antitrust Litigation, 1978-1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 62,070 (D. Md. 1978).
93. See 552 F.2d at 777-78.
94. See Brief for Respondent State of Illinois in Opposition to Certiorari, at 8-14, and Brief
for Respondent Sarbaugh in Opposition to Certiorari, at 6-7.
95. The Fifth Circuit did cite U.S. Industries for the proposition that grand jury secrecy
was designed "to create a sanctuary, inviolate to any intrusion ..
" See 546 F.2d at 626,
n.8. In light of the holding in US. Industries, this citation is surprising and borders upon
misinterpretation of the case. See text accompanying notes 59 through 62, supra.
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16(a)(1)(A) disclosure, it considers inadequately the effect of that
breach of secrecy on the underlying reasons for retaining secrecy.
Regardless of how broadly the court characterized the State of
Texas' request for grand jury materials," the "secret" transcripts
were nonetheless in the hands of the corporate defendants, the party
"who has greater incentive and power to retaliate than anyone
else."97 This factual situation was inimical to the circumstances
presented in the cases that the Fifth Circuit cited to support its
decision."
The second, and foremost, defect in United States Steel is the
court's treatment of the "retaliation" argument. Although the Fifth
Circuit acknowledged the Procter & Gamble dicta regarding the
danger of retaliation from the corporate employer, it failed to realistically apply the Supreme Court's warning to the instant circumstances. 9 Setting aside the question of whether a witness' discovery
of his own transcript breaches grand jury secrecy, the Fifth Circuit's
analogy of that situation to the corporate employer's procurement
of a copy of its employee's transcript is a misinterpretation of the
Supreme Court's principal reason for safeguarding grand jury secrecy. This rationale is suspect as a matter of statutory construction. Rule 16(a)(1)(A) treats the corporation in a manner different
from the individual defendant. While the individual has a right to
review his own transcript, the corporate defendant may, only in the
court's discretion, be allowed to discover its employee's testimony. 11
Furthermore, in discussing the issues of retaliation, Procter &
Gamble and Pittsburgh Plate Glass did not speak of a dichotomy
between "corporate spokesman" and "disaffected employees." In
those cases the Court held that if retaliation does indeed occur, it
will come primarily from the corporate employer. If, as the Fifth
Circuit implies, employer retaliation does not in fact occur, the sole
remaining source of retaliation is others in the industry. As
Sarbaugh illustrates, this residual need for secrecy may be recognized by a protective order. 0 1
Ultimately, the holding in United States Steel is not founded
upon the rationale of retaliation. The court's conclusion is based
96. The Fifth Circuit characterized Texas' request as "whole hog or none" and indicated
that the state had to "draw a finer bead" in its motion for discovery of grand jury transcripts.
546 F.2d at 631.
97. 552 F.2d at 775.
98. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, (1958); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
v. City of Fort Pierce, Fla., 323 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1963).
99. 546 F.2d at 630.
100. See note 46 supra.
101. 552 F.2d at 775.
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more accurately upon sympathy for the criminal corporate defendant which, by exercising its right to petition for criminal discovery,
exposes itself to disclosure in a treble damage action.'0° Although
this dilemma exists, it is an insufficient basis for denying the discovery of important factual data in the civil litigation. The corporate
defendant has no right to discover the transcript of his employee.
In seeking criminal discovery, the corporation is only making the
same choice that all litigants in criminal actions faced with the
possibility of a derivative civil suit must make. This is especially
true in antitrust litigation where the Clayton Act facilitates the civil
plaintiff's use of a prior criminal judgment.'0 3
United States Steel is out of step with the decisive majority of
cases decided since U.S. Industries which have indicated that the
traditional reasons in support of grand jury secrecy are seriously
undercut, if not irrelevant, where prior disclosure has been made.
In contrast, Sarbaugh draws heavily from the numerous district
court decisions permitting disclosure. Although the case retreats
from more radical lower court decisions in that it retains the particularized need test, the Sarbaugh standard differs considerably
from the test adopted in the Electrical Equipment cases and reaffirmed in United States Steel. 104
In summary, Sarbaugh replaces the hypothetical statements concerning retaliation made by prior courts with an investigation of the
actual probability of retaliation presented by the facts of the case.
Furthermore, the hoary in camera procedure of the Electrical
Equipment cases is replaced by a streamlined method of produc102. See notes 64-65 supra. Cf.Hancock Bros., Inc. v. Jones, 293 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Cal.
1968); Similar arguments were rejected in Sarbaugh, see Brief of Intervenors-Appellees, at
41-42, and in In re Arizona Dairy Products Litigation; 1976-1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 60,910
(D. Ariz.), affd, (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 1975).
103. See note 6 supra.
104. There are indications that Sarbaugh is already being read expansively by lower
federal courts. In granting disclosure to treble damage plaintiffs in the Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, MDL-250 (N.D. Ill.
1977), Judge Will said: "I am prepared to be satisfied,
as Judge Tone [author of Sarbaugh] apparently is, that there is a particularized need, per
se, for grand jury testimony if it is not still subject to the provisions with respect to the
maintaining of the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings." See supra note 61, at 46.
See also Petrol Stops Northwest v. United States, 1978-1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,935 (9th
Cir. 1978), appeal docketed sub nom. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, No. 77-1547
(Sup. Ct. April 28, 1978), in which the court followed the reasoning of Sarbaugh in granting
disclosure. The Ninth Circuit indicated that "[tihe [district] court reasonably could conclude that a plaintiff's need for grand jury records to ferret out the facts in a private antitrust
action might be far more compelling than a defendant's curiosity about what its employees
may have disclosed." Id. at 73, 956. For another post-Sarbaughdecision granting disclosure,
see Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 1978-1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 62,020 (E.D.
Ark. 1978). The decision was certified for immediate interlocutory appeal.
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tion.' 5 Under Sarbaugh, if prior disclosure has been made and the
transcripts are to be used for impeachment or refreshing recollection
at deposition or trial, particularized need exists, and the civil plaintiff is entitled to review the transcripts.
Questions Unanswered by Sarbaugh
The Seventh Circuit strongly emphasized the existence of previous disclosure to support the discovery of grand jury materials. It
has been suggested, however, that prior disclosure is irrelevant
where the grand jury has been disbanded and the criminal case has
been concluded.'10 In these circumstances only the fourth reason for
secrecy, the encouragement of free and untrammeled disclosure by
grand jury witnesses, may be applicable. This notion has been traditionally based upon the witness' subjective expectation that his
testimony will be heard exclusively by the grand jury.'"7 In practice,
however, such a subjective expectation is unrealistic. As one commentator has stated:
the witness must realize when he is first contacted by the prosecution that any testimony he gives to the grand jury will in most
cases also have to be given at the trial. Any prosecuting attorney
who did not so advise a key government witness, who due to ignorance or naivet6 failed to recognize this fact, would seem remiss
in his duty. 09
The remote possibility of secrecy is further exemplified by the
Supreme Court's holding in Brady v. Maryland,' Rule 16(a)(1)(A)
and the Jencks Act. Furthermore, the fact of actual disclosure to
corporate employers should make no difference, since future employee grand jury witnesses would be aware of their corporate employer's right to review their testimony." 0
Therefore, since grand jury witnesses often have no right to expect
the future confidentiality of their testimony, the fourth remaining
ground for secrecy is effectively undermined. The residual reason for
secrecy, fear of retaliation from other members of the industry, may
be overcome by an appropriate protective order. Even this reason
105. See text accompanying notes 51 through 56 supra. The Fifth Circuit reserved ruling
on this point in United States Steel. See 546 at 631, n.ll.
106. See In re Sugar Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,808 at 73,346
n.3.
107. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959); Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S.
677, 681-82 (1958).
108. Knudsen, supra note 19, at 443-44. Nearly 20 years ago Mr. Justice Brennan made a
similar observation in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 360 U.S. at 406.
109. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see note 44 supra.
110. Brief for the United States, supra note 7, at 7.
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for secrecy may be eroded by defendant's cross-delivery of transcripts and de-briefing memoranda, or by exposure to grand jury
materials, or by exposure to grand jury testimony at pre-sentencing
hearings."'
Assuming, however, that prior disclosure reaches the level of importance attributed to it in Sarbaugh, the opinion leaves unanswered questions which may arise in two situations: where disclosure has been made previously to counsel for individual defendants,
but not corporate defendants; and where less than all of the codefendants in the criminal case have obtained discovery of grand
2
jury materials.",
Although the Fifth Circuit indicated in United States Steel that
secrecy remained unaffected by an individual's receipt of his own
transcript, the Seventh Circuit properly signalled its disagreement."' The equality of access rationale of U.S. Industries is as
applicable when the individual defendant receives his transcript, as
when the corporation gains access to it. Where the individual defendant remains an officer or employee of the corporation, it strains the
corporate fiction to isolate the employee from the employer. In most
cases, secrecy is destroyed where the employee has been de-briefed
by corporate counsel and the substance of his testimony is disclosed
without actual production of the grand jury transcript."'
The problem created by disclosure to less than all defendants may
arise when a criminal defendant pleads nolo contendre or guilty but
other co-defendants go to trial. The co-defendants may obtain access to grand jury materials that the former defendant could have
obtained had he gone to trial, including testimony given by that
party's employee. When the treble damage plaintiff obtains discovery of all grand jury materials disclosed in the criminal case, he may
be receiving materials that some defendants have never seen. Yet,
in fairness to the "guilty" defendant's defense in the civil case,
disclosure should be made. Thus, the "guilty" defendant may obtain discovery of its employee's statements in the civil case for the
first time. Theoretically, the fourth policy reason for secrecy is first
breached by civil, not criminal, discovery." 5 In practice, however,
this factual situation is more ideal than real. De-briefing, the need
111. The government's bill of particulars may also contain excerpts from grand jury
testimony and this will further reduce the remaining secrecy. See Brief for Appellants at 37,
In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, No. 77-1674, 1697, 1798 (7th Cir. Dec. 1, 1977).
112. See e.g., In re Sugar Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 TRAE CAsEs (CCH)
61,808 at
73,345 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
113. 552 F.2d at 777-78; see note 61 supra.
114. See note 88 supra.
115. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 111, at 37.

19781

Grand Jury Transcripts

1005

of co-defendants to establish a common defense," ' and access to presentencing memoranda" 7 often will provide all defendants with a
strong indication of the substance of the employee's testimony. The
courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have not been persuaded by
this general argument." 8
Finally, it is not uncommon for a corporate employee to invoke
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination when a
civil plaintiff attempts to depose or examine him at trial. Under
Sarbaugh, discovery of the witness' transcript is not obtainable
since the civil plaintiff cannot demonstrate the requirements for
particularized need by using the transcripts to impeach or refresh
recollection. ' The Seventh Circuit's conclusion, however, obviates
the "equal access" rationale of U.S. Industries. It also provides a
particularly unfortunate result because the fourth reason for secrecy, if it has validity in any circumstances,'20 exists to the same
limited degree as it did in the factual setting of the Sarbaugh case.
At least one court has implicitly ruled that the invocation of the
fifth amendment by a witness creates a sufficient showing of parti2
cularized need.' '

A similar question is presented where the witness dies prior to the
civil litigation. In this situation, discovery should not turn upon the
witness' availability at the deposition or trial. Where there has been
prior disclosure, secrecy has been breached and equal access to relevant grand jury materials does not exist. Under this circumstance
the need for disclosure is compelling because there is no alternative
source of the decedent's testimony and retaliation is no longer a
consideration. In Baker v. United States Steel Corp.,' 22 the Second

Circuit rejected the proposition that a deceased witness grand jury
testimony could be used in a treble damage action. However, in In
re Sugar Antitrust Litigation, 23 the district court expressly declined
to follow Baker, and authorized the discovery of a decedent's grand
jury testimony.
Insofar as Sarbaugh disallows the use of grand jury testimony to
116. 552 F.2d at 775.
117. See, e.g., U.S. Industries, Inc. v. United States District Court, 345 F.2d 18 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
118. United States v. Alton Box Board Co. - In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation,
No. 77-1674, 1697, 1798 (7th Cir. Dec. 1, 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3763 (1978); In re
Sugar Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,808 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
119. Id. at 777.
120. See text accompanying notes 106 through 111 supra.
121. United States v. Borden, Inc., 1976-2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,177 (D. Ariz. 1976).
122. 492 F.2d 1074, 1079 (2d Cir. 1974)(dictum); see also Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 50 F.R.D. at 40 n.3 (N.D. II. 1969).
123. 1977-2 TRADE CASES (CCH) $ 61,808 at 73,347 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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the fullest extent possible under the Federal Rules of Evidence,'" it
does not realistically resolve the controversies of grand jury secrecy.
The policy of secrecy inherent in grand jury proceedings should
yield to the paramount interest in obtaining the truth where the
reasons for grand jury secrecy are absent.
A

PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPT ISSUE

How Do You Get Them?
In United States Steel and Sarbaugh, the discovery of grand jury
materials was initiated by a Rule 34 request to the defendants or by
subpoena to the Justice Department. Although neither court attributed any significance to that difference, 2 ' the Seventh Circuit indicated that, in view of the Justice Department's prosecutorial interest in the disclosure of grand jury materials, notice should be given
to the Department whenever discovery is sought. 2 ' Even though a
court order is not a prerequisite for disclosure,' a party may ask the
court to impose protective conditions upon the discovery of grand
jury materials." 8
Pursuant to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Sarbaugh, a plaintiff may obtain a deponent's grand jury transcript at the time the
deposition is scheduled. However, at least one court appears not to
have followed this procedure to the letter. 29 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit recognized that once the right to production has been
found to exist, only the Rule 26130 test of relevancy remains. All
documents, including grand jury materials, requested in the course
of civil discovery must comply with this test. Thereafter, if the
defendant who has received a request for transcripts believes that
all, or portions, of the transcripts are irrelevant, he can refuse to
124. See text accompanying note 146 infra.
125. See 552 F.2d at 777, n.14.
126. Id.
127. The post-Sarbaugh experience of the State of Illinois' Antitrust Division has been
that voluntary production of transcripts has been made by some defendants in related cases.
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
129. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,807
(N.D. Ill. 1977).
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) provides in pertinent part:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or
defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is
not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
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3
produce the materials and compel the court to rule on this issue.' '
Conceivably, this may revive the practice of in camera inspection
that was rejected by the Supreme Court in Dennis and by the court
of appeals in Sarbaugh. In most cases, however, the court would
only review the limited portions to which the relevancy objection
has been directed.
This problem may be somewhat fictitious. Rule 16(a)(1)(A) provides that a corporate defendant may discover only "relevant" employee testimony. This language requires a relevancy test before the
Justice Department will even disclose the transcripts in the first
instance. Because of this initial relevancy determination, the propriety of discovery is settled in connection with any later disclosures
that may be made. As is often the case in private antitrust litigation, the issues in the civil proceedings are identical to those presented previously in the criminal action. Consequently, the civil
plaintiff should be entitled to all grand jury transcripts in the defendant's possession.
The disclosed transcript may be used like any other document at
a deposition, subject to the limitations set forth in Sarbaugh concerning impeachment and refreshing recollection. It would be more
appropriate, however, to allow its use in any manner that is consistent with Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence.

Once You Have Got Them, What Do You Do With Them?
The Sarbaugh decision facilitates a private litigant's access to
grand jury transcripts. Once these materials have been secured,
however, collateral considerations regarding the proper use of grand
jury testimony must be addressed.
The novelty of the Federal Rules of Evidence renders uncertain
the evidentiary implications of the Sarbaugh decision and creates
possibilities for expanded use of grand jury transcripts at trial. The
desirability of this expansion has been questioned. One commentator has suggested that courts may be premature in accepting the use
32
of grand jury materials without further safeguards.' Premising his
contention on the ex parte character of grand jury proceedings and
on the absence of procedural due process protections in the taking
33
of testimony before the grand jury,' the author has criticised courts
for adopting "an uncritical acceptance of grand jury testimony as
131.
132.
133.

552 F.2d at 777.
Nitschke, supra note 63.
Id. at 199.
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more, rather than less, reliable."' 34 The courts have maintained,
however, that grand jury testimony has sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness to allow its substantive use at trial:
Both . . .testimony and evidence before a grand jury have . . .
the sanction of what Wigmore calls the "prophylactic rules" relating to the oath and to perjury, influencing "the witness subjectively against conscious falsification, the one by reminding of ultimate punishment by a supernatural power, the other by reminding
of speedy punishment by a temporal power."'' 5

Refreshing Recollection and Impeachment
Traditionally, a witness' grand jury testimony is used to refresh
the witness' recollection or for impeachment. 31 In the former situation, the witness is handed only the statement in order to revive his
memory. Since the witness is testifying on the basis of an independent recollection of the events described, 37 the transcript is not
38
entered into evidence and its contents are not read aloud.
On the other hand, if grand jury testimony is used to impeach the
witness, the impeaching portions will be read aloud in order to
contradict the witness' trial statements. The jury is requested not
to regard the grand jury testimony as substantive evidence, but
merely to consider the statements as potential grounds for disregarding the witness' trial testimony.'3 9

Substantive Use: Pre-FederalRules of Evidence
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, grand jury
testimony could be offered as evidence, not merely to cast doubt on
the witness' trial testimony, but for the truth of the matter asserted
in the transcript. As early as 1933, notes of grand jury testimony
were admitted against a defendant as an admission of a partyoppenent. 4 " Furthermore, where the witness' memory was not re134. Id. at 207.
135. United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929, 934 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979
(1964) quoting 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1813, 1831 (3rd ed. 1940).; see also United States v.
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2174 (1977).
136. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958); Felder v. United
States, 9 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 648 (1926).
137. FED. R. EVID. 612; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 9, at 14 (2d
ed. 1972)[hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK].
138. In United States v. Socony-Vaccuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940)(dictum), the
Court indicated that "there would be error where under the pretext of refreshing a witness'
recollection, the prior testimony was introduced as evidence."; accord Gaines v. United
States, 349 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
139. Nitschke, supra note 63, at 199.
140. Metzler v. United States, 64 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1933).
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freshed by showing him his grand jury testimony, some courts allowed the substantive introduction of the transcript under the past
recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule.' This action
was criticised since the grand jury, in most instances, was not
"contemporaneous with the occurences as to which the witness was
testifying."'4 However, in United States v. Socony-Vaccuum Oil
Co., 43 the Supreme Court noted that the use of grand jury testimony
in this manner would be appropriate where "there was a continuing
conspiracy extending at least up to the period when the witnesses
were testifying before the grand jury."' 4
A third substantive use of grand jury testimony developed in
situations characterized by the "turncoat witness" - the witness who
disavows previously sworn grand jury testimony when he testifies at
trial. In this context, Judge Friendly, in United States v. DeSisto,"M
labelled the notion of restricting grand jury testimony to impeachment purposes only "a pious fraud.""' The judge reasoned that the
oath and penalty of perjury provided sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to allow substantive use of the testimony.
Substantive Use: The Federal Rules Approach
The recently enacted Federal Rules of Evidence have codified the
aforementioned practice and have created additional methods for
introducing grand jury testimony in subsequent litigation. Under
the Rules, the use of transcripts for impeachment and refreshing
recollection continues, and the substantive admissibility of grand
jury testimony may be expanded.
Under Rule 801(d)(1)(A),1 7 where a witness testifies at trial, is
subject to cross-examination and makes a statement inconsistent
with his grand jury testimony, the courts have uniformly held that
the grand jury transcript may be read to the jury and considered as
substantive evidence. "8 The House-Senate Conference Report indi141. United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001
(1967); United States v. Ward Baking Co., 224 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Pa. 1963). Contra United
States v. F.M.C. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1106, 1135-37 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
142. United States v. Socony-Vaccuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 236 (1940). Under FED. R.
EvID. 803(5), the requirement of strict contemporaneity has been dropped. The rule requires
that the recorded recollection be "shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when
the matter was fresh in his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly." See McCoRMICK,
supra note 137, § 301, at 713-14. Under the new rule, grand jury testimony could arguably
qualify as past recollection recorded.
143. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
144. Id.at 236.
145. 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964).
146. Id.at 933.
147. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(a).
148. United States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mosley, 555
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cates that "[tihe committee consciously intended to include grand
jury proceedings within the ambit of [the] 'other proceedings'
[provision of 801(J)(1)(A)]."' 49 Although the use of grand jury testimony is improper before an inconsistency is demonstrated,'50 introduction is permissible when " a reasonable man could infer on
comparing the whole effect of the two statements that they had been
produced by inconsistent beliefs."''
Despite the Rule's commitment to expanded use of grand jury
materials, the reliability of this type of previous testimony is still
questioned. Judge Weinstein's treatise on the Federal Rules indicates:
most prior inconsistent statements used at trials are given under
circumstances where there are subtle and sometimes severe pressures operating to skew the story one way or the other. The inconsistent statement may be given.

.

. before

a Grand Jury where the

witness can be led, advertently or otherwise, to give a somewhat
colored version of the events. .

.

. Very few such statements used

are given in a completely neutral and unpressured setat trial
2
ting.

15

Nonetheless, in view of the opportunity to cross-examine the witness on both his past and present testimony, most courts have been

unimpressed by this argument. This is even true where evidence
suggests that the prosecution employed leading questions before the

grand jury.'53 Thus, the prior statement is to be considered by the
jury as fully as any statement that the witness might have made on
the stand. Cases in which grand jury statements of a co-conspirator
have been held admissible, not only against the declarant but also
against co-conspirators, are consistent with this rationale. 54

F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 428 (1977); United States v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Blitz, 533 F.2d 1329 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Jordano, 521 F.2d 695 (2d Cir.
1975); United States v. Gerry, 515 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975)(prerules); United States v. Rivera, 513 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 948 (1975)(prerules). Cf. United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1976)(prior inconsistent
statements made at immigration hearing admissible substantively under 801(d)(1)(A)).
149. United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 1976); Conference Report
to FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A), 28 U.S.C.A. at 527.
150. United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1975).
801(d)(1)(A)[01] at 801-76 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
151. 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE,
WEINSTEIN].

152. Id. at 801-74-801-74.1.
153. United States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 428 (1977). But see United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977);
see also Advisory Committee Comments to FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
154. United States v. Blitz, 533 F.2d 1329, 1345 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Gerry,
515 F.2d 130, 141 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975). Of course, the existence of a
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Another ground for admissibility is Rule 801(d)(2) - the admission
of a party-opponent. Since the underlying justification for admissibility here is that "[a] party can hardly object that he had no
opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath,"' 5 the stringent
conditions imposed under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) are not necessary to
establish the admissibility of a party's admission to the grand jury.
Under these circumstances, the justification is additionally supported in that the grand jury witness was under oath and penalty
of perjury."5
Under the Rule, admissions comprise both actual statements of
the party and statements imputed to him under various theories. In
an antitrust context it is common for a corporate officer or employee
to testify before the grand jury. Thereafter, the corporate employer
may obtain discovery of the transcript if relevancy is demonstrated
and if the employee had authority to bind the employer either at
the time he testified or at the time he took part in the offensive
conduct.'5 7 It is arguable that once the court has determined that
the corporation has the right to discover its employee's relevant
testimony, a determination has also been made that those grand
jury statements were given by an "agent or servant concerning a
matter within the scope of his agency or employment. . . .,'u However, this rule applies only if the witness is still employed by the
corporation at the time he testifies. In any event, the party seeking
the transcript could still prove the statements were made within the
scope of the agent's authority 5' or his agency or employment. 6 0
If an agency relationship is demonstrated, the availability of the
witness at trial is immaterial. "Rule 801(d)(2) represents an accomodation to the common sense view that statements of a principal
actor should generally be received rather than excluded per se. Because of their value they are receivable whether or not the declarant
conspiracy must be independently established. United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274, 282
(7th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972); FED.R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E).
155. 2 E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 266 (1961). See MCCORMICK, supra note
136, at § 262.
156. An additional guarantee of trustworthiness is the fact that there will often be a
stenographic record of an admission before the grand jury. It should be noted, however, that
Rule 6(e) does not require transcription of grand jury testimony. See WRIGHT, supra note 2,
§ 104 at 161. One commentator has argued that transcription should be mandatory. See
Knudsen, supra note 19, at 443.
157. See text accompanying notes 45 through 46 supra.
158. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
159. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C).
160. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D); see United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 289 n.21 (2d
Cir. 1973).
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appears as a witness.""' Thus, the intervening death of a grand jury
witness should not preclude the use of his transcript at trial.'6 2
Moreover, the wit.iess' invocation of his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination at the civil trial should not bar the introduction of his grand jury testimony.'6 3
Inasmuch as admissions are admissible into evidence as a result
of the character of the adversary system,'64 the unavailability of the
grand jury witness at trial necessarily limits the use to which the
evidence can be applied. In a situation where there are codefendants, the grand jury testimony of an unavailable employee
should be admissible only against the declarant's employer. The
absence of the employee forecloses the co-defendant's right of crossexamination and the "adversary system" rationale is no longer
applicable. In such a case the co-defendant would clearly be entitled
to a limiting instruction.' 5
The admissibility of grand jury testimony as substantive evidence
is also possible under various hearsay exceptions recognized by the
Federal Rules.' 6 Where the witness is unavailable, the need for his
testimony is heightened. Rule 804 provides two bases on which
courts can admit grand jury transcripts in the absence of the witness:' 7 a statement against the declarant's interest'68 and the
161. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 151, at 801-115; McIntosh v. Eagle Fire Co. of N.Y., 325
F.2d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1963).
162. Contra Baker v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.2d at 1079. But see, In re Sugar
Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,808 at 73,347 n.5; see text accompanying notes 122 through 124 supra.
163. Cf. United States v. Borden, Inc., 1976-2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,177 (D.Ariz. 1976)
(particularized need for disclosure of grand jury transcripts to treble damage plaintiffs shown
where corporate employees of defendant invoked Fifth Amendment at deposition); see text
accompanying note 121 supra.
164. Advisory Committee Comments to FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2).
165. FED. R. EVID. 105. A limiting instruction would seem to satisfy the requirements of
due process in the context of civil litigation. But cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968) (limiting instruction insufficient to protect criminal defendant's right to confrontation). A co-defendant could possibly move for a severance where this problem is presented.
166. For possible admissibility under the FED. R. EVID. 803(5) exception for past recollection recorded, see note 142 supra.
167. FED. R. EVID. 804(a) defines unavailability:
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as witness" includes situations
in which the declarant(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement
despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable
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"catch-all" exception for statements that exhibit sufficient trustworthiness but do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception. 9
The former, Rule 804(b)(3), rests on the assumption that persons
will not make damaging statements against themselves unless they
are true. 7 " Where a corporate employee is testifying before an antitrust grand jury, he is under pressure from various sources to refrain
from making statements against his, and the corporation's, interest
unless they are true. His statements not only subject him and his
company to possible criminal liability, but they may also be the
cause of pecuniary loss to himself and his employer should he lose
his job or should his employer be sued in a treble damage action.
Under the circumstances, the rationale of the exception is met.
Because the basis for admitting these statements is their inherent
trustworthiness, which vitiates the need for cross-examination, the
statements should, assuming their relevancy, be admissible against
all defendants in the case.
In light of suggested weaknesses of grand jury testimony, 7 ' commentators have argued that opposing counsel should be allowed to
"demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of evidence that the
particular declarant was probably lying."' 72 Clearly, where the declarant's penal or pecuniary interest is not threatened,' the basis
for the exception is undermined. The Fifth Circuit recently recognized this in reversing the lower court's admission of grand jury
testimony under a statement against interest theory.'7 4 Furthermore, the trial court, in making a relevancy determination, has the
discretion to inquire into the trustworthiness of the grand jury statement."'
Similarly, the factual context of a given case will greatly determine admissibility of grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(5).
to procure his attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision
(b)(2),(3), or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable
means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack
of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the
proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending
or testifying.
168. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
169. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
170. WEINSTEIN, supra note 151, at 804-77.
171. See text accompanying notes 131 through 133, and 151, supra.
172. Comment, DeclarationAgainst Interest - Rules of Admissibility, 62 Nw. U. L. REV.
934, 942 (1968); see WEINSTEIN, supra note 150, 804(b)(3)[021 at 804-85.
173. E.g., the defendant has been convicted of a crime or granted immunity.
174. United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977).
175. FED. R. EviD. 403; Weinstein, supra note 151, T 804(b)(3)[02] at 804-85.
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Courts that have considered the question have reached different
results. 7 ' As a consequence, generalizations regarding the results
that could be reacaed on the facts of a particular case are inappropriate.
CONCLUSION

The viability of the policy underlying the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings is undergoing radical change. The theory of secrecy
reflected by the Supreme Court's decision in Procter& Gamble has
been rejected by numerous courts and legal commentators. Illinois
v. Sarbaugh represents a significant recognition of this fact. However, Texas v. United States Steel retained this outmoded legal
construct. The preservation of grand jury secrecy after the grand
jury has been discharged is becoming indefensible. The demise of
grand jury secrecy cannot be traced to the civil discovery of grand
jury transcripts. Rather, the attenuating boundaries of secrecy are
a product of conscious policy choices embodied in the expansion of
criminal discovery. Enlightened judicial realization of this fact will
contribute to the achievement of "full disclosure of all available
evidence in order that justice may be served." "
STEPHEN PAUL JUECH
176. Compare United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 2174 (1977), with United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) and Estate of
Hollis R. Temple v. C.I.R., 65 T.C. 776 (1976).
177. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. City of Fort Pierce, Fla., 323 F.2d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1963).

